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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The two separate issues set forth by Appellant are redundant and this appeal 
actually presents only one issue: Whether the trial court committed reversible error in 
ruling that Appellant failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. This Court reviews the trial 
court's ruling for correctness and "may affirm a summary judgment on any ground 
available to the trial court, even if not relied on below." Straub v. Fisher & Paykel Health 
Care, 1999 UT 102, ^ P6, 990 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1999). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issue presented in this 
appeal: 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. 
"Governmental entity" means the state and its political 
subdivisions as defined in this chapter. 
"Political subdivision" means any . . . public transit district. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) & (7) (1993). 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
(3)(b) I he notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian..; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible 
governmental entity according to the requirement 
Section 63-30- 12 or 63 30 13. 
Utah Code Ami. § 63-30-11(2) & (3)(b) (1993). 
A claim against a po1 ision, or againsi 
employee for ' -curring durinp 
performance < cope of ei ni, or 
under color o1 :ss notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision 
within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration 
of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, 
regardless of whether or not thr J "" *:on giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as govef 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). 
I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure 
"I he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
partv is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 
Utah R. Civ. 1'. X v ; . 
Complete texts of these statutes and rules an. (""fovuln! in (lie ,< uliliiidiiiii IT n 
S" I A fEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts 
Deienaant/\pj)L -! >**f 
following facts in its statement of undisputed facts in juppoii of summary judgment 
2 
(R. 18-19) These facts were uncontro verted by Appellant and are thus "deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment" Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-501(2)(B). 
On March 4, 1995, Appellant fell while on a UTA bus. (R. 2, 18) On March 1, 
1996, Appellant sent a letter to the office of the Utah State Attorney General, and to 
"Utah Transit Authority, Claims Department." (R. 18, 28, 31)1 Appellant's March 1, 
1996 letter purported to be a notice of claim under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11, relating 
to Appellant's March 4, 1995 accident. (R. 1,18) On March 4, 1997, Appellant filed a 
complaint against UTA in Third District Court seeking damages allegedly caused by 
Appellant's March 4, 1995 accident. (R. 1-4) 
B. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below 
This case involves Appellant's challenge to the trial court's finding that Appellant 
failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 
et seq. (the "Act"). After answering Appellant's complaint, UTA filed a motion for 
summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Appellant's claims against UTA. (R. 16-25) In 
its summary judgment motion, UTA argued that Appellant failed to comply with the 
Act's notice of claim requirement. (Id.) 
Appellant filed a memorandum opposing UTA's summary judgment motion, and a 
supporting affidavit from Shawna Powers, an employee of Appellant's counsel. (R. 28-
33) In her affidavit, Ms. Powers recounted an alleged telephone conversation in which an 
1
 The record below does not contain a copy of Appellant's March 1, 1996 letter. 
However, the March 1, 1996 letter's content and addressees were undisputed below 
and/or evident from the record. (R. 18, 31) 
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employee of UTA's risk department supposedly told Ms. Powers that UTA had received 
Appellant's March 1, 1996 letter. (R. 33) 
UTA filed a reply memorandum in further support of its summary judgment 
motion. (R. 34-37) UTA also filed an affidavit from the UTA employee, James 
Anderson, with whom Ms. Powers allegedly had the telephone conversation described in 
her affidavit. (R. 38-41) In his affidavit, Mr. Anderson stated, among other assertions, 
that when he receives notices of claim he assumes that the claimant also served UTA's 
governing board. (R. 40) Hence, Mr. Anderson stated that it was not his practice to 
serve such notices on UTA's board because this is the claimant's responsibility. (Id.) 
On October 31, 1997, the trial court entered a minute entiy granting UTA's 
summary judgment motion. (R. 44) On November 25, 1997, Appellant filed a notice of 
appeal from the trial court's decision. (R. 46) In an Order on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment issued on November 26, 1997, the trial court granted UTA's 
summary judgment motion, based on Appellant's failure to comply with the Act. (R. 47) 
On October 11, 2000, the clerk of this Court sent Appellant's counsel a letter 
stating the Appellant's notice of appeal had been received, and setting forth relevant 
deadlines. (R. 49) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not commit reversible error in finding that Appellant failed to 
comply with the Act. The Act clearly requires that notices of claims against UTA be 
filed with UTA's governing body, which is delineated by statute. Yet, Appellant served 
her purported notice of claim on an employee of UTA's claims department. 
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Utah appellate courts have consistently mandated strict compliance with the Act, 
including the requirement that the "notice of claim must be filed with the correct persons 
or entities;' Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp,, 911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct App. 1996). 
Appellant has advanced no factual or legal reason to excuse her lack of compliance with 
the Act. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Appellant 
failed to comply with the Act. 
ARGUMENT 
L APPELLANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE ACT'S NOTICE 
OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS 
As an unequivocal matter of Utah law, the trial court correctly granted UTA's 
summary judgment motion based on Appellant's failure to comply with the Act. The Act 
plainly provided that "[a] claim against a political subdivision . . . is barred unless notice 
of claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). UTA is a public transit district 
and a political subdivision for purposes of this requirement. See id. § 63-30-2(3) & (7); 
Salt Lake On Track v. Salt Lake City, 939 P.2d 680, 681 (Ulah 1997). Under the 
codification of the Utah Public Transit District Act applicable when Appellant was 
required to file her notice of claim, UTA's governing body was a board of directors. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1038 (Supp. 1994). 
Hence, the Act mandated that Appellant file a notice of claim with UTA's board 
of directors within one year of Appellant's March 4, 1995 accident. Appellant did not 
comply with this requirement. Instead, Appellant sent a letter purporting to be a notice of 
5 
claim to the office of the Utah State Attorney General, and to "Utah Transit Authority, 
Claims Department," and never filed a notice of claim with UTA's governing board. (R. 
18, 28, 31) As a matter of law, Appellant failed to comply with the Act's notice of claim 
requirement precluding her claim against UTA. 
IL THE ACT REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE 
Utah appellate courts "have consistently required strict compliance with the 
requirements of the Immunity Act." Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 
(Utah 1999) (emphasis added). More specifically, Utah appellate courts demand strict 
compliance with the requirement that the "notice of claim must be filed with the correct 
persons or entities," under penalty of dismissal. Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 
P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Hence, Appellant was required to strictly comply with the Act's requirement that 
her notice of claim be filed with UTA's board of directors. Mailing a purported notice of 
claim to the Attorney General and to UTA's claims department did not meet this 
requirement. See Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1996) (affirming dismissal for 
failure to serve notice of claim on proper parties); Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 
P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (same); Lamarr v. Department of Transp., 828 
P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same). 
III. APPELLANT HAS PRESENTED NO VALID REASON TO EXCUSE 
HER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ACT 
The fact that Appellant mailed her notice of claim to a department within UTA 
does not excuse her failure to comply with the Act. Utah courts hold claimants to such a 
6 
rigid standard under the Act's notice of claim requirements that even "[a]ctual notice 
does not cure a party's failure to meet these requirements." Rushton, 977 P.2d at 1203. 
Moreover, arguments that a claimant "effectively complied" with the Act's delivery 
requirements, or that "the intent of the statute was satisfied," do not permit claimants to 
sidestep the Act's notice of claim requirements. LamaiT, 828 P.2d at 540-41. 
Moreover, the alleged telephone conversation between an employee of Appellant's 
counsel and UTA's employee does not excuse Appellant's failure to strictly comply with 
the Act. Nowhere in the affidavit recounting this alleged conversation is it claimed that 
anyone from UTA specifically waived proper notice under the Act, or represented that 
the Act had been complied with. Also, Appellant's claims regarding the alleged 
telephone conversation amount to nothing more than an argument that UTA is estopped 
from denying proper service of a notice of claim. "As a general rule, estoppel may not be 
invoked against a governmental entity" and exceptions to this rule generally require 
"specific written representations by authorized government entities." Anderson v. 
Public Service Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). 
Appellant did not obtain written confirmation of the disposition of her purported 
notice of claim, even though filing the notice was jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit 
against UTA. In other words, Appellant failed to obtain a specific written representation 
by an authorized UTA representative that her notice of claim was correctly filed. This 
failure precludes Appellant's claim that UTA is estopped from raising her non-
compliance with the Act by an alleged telephone conversation. 
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Finally, the fact that UTA's claims department received a copy of Appellant's 
purported notice of claim does not excuse Appellant's failure to file a notice of claim 
with UTA's governing board. Service on UTA's board was the responsibility of 
Appellant, not UTA. This Court has held that: 
Where the statutes are clear. . . as to the requirement for 
serving a notice of claim on a political subdivision, we cannot 
require and the statutes do not require that the state or its 
subdivisions promptly notify claimants of deficiencies of the 
notice of claim so as to allow them an opportunity to timely 
rectify their error or deficiency. 
Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1996). The Act was clear as to the requirement 
for serving a notice of claim on UTA. Hence, this Court should not require, and the 
statutes do not require, that UTA's claims department notify Appellant of deficiencies in 
her notice of claim. 
Appellant defends her failure to comply with the Act by citing Brittain v. State, 
882 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, subsequent Utah case law demonstrates 
that Brittain does not apply to this case. After its decision in Brittain, the Utah Court of 
Appeals ruled that the precedential effect of that case and similar cases "is limited by 
their unique factual underpinnings." Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294, 
1297 (Utah Ct App. 1996). More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that cases like 
Brittain should not "be construed as an indication that [Utah courts] are prepared to 
abrogate the long-standing rule requiring strict compliance with all aspects of the 
Governmental Immunity Act." Id 
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The "unique factual underpinnings" in Brittain demonstrate why it does not apply 
to this case. In Brittain, the court examined a plaintiffs compliance with a former 
codification of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12, which required service of a notice of claim 
on "the agency concerned." Id at 669. The court ruled that the plaintiffs service of a 
notice of claim on the Utah State Risk Management Division met this requirement, due to 
the "nebulous and broad[] language" of the "agency concerned" designation. Id. at 670. 
In contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993) required Appellant to serve UTA's 
governing body, which is specifically delineated in the Utah Public Transit District Act. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1038 (Supp. 1994). 
Also, the plaintiff in Brittain was claiming against the State, rather than a political 
subdivision like UTA. See id. at 668. The court cited to specific statutes and 
administrative rules suggesting that serving a notice of claim on the Utah State Division 
of Risk Management was appropriate. See id. at 671-72 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 63 A-
4-101 to -206 & Utah Admin. Code R37-1-1 to -5). These statutes have no application 
to UTA and neither does the Brittain holding. 
Likewise, the holding in Larsen v. Park City Municipal Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 
1998), also cited by Appellant, does not apply to this case. The Larsen holding dealt with 
service of a notice of claim against a city. See id. at 343. The Larsen court noted that, in 
serving notices of claim on cities, the city council is the governing body under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-13. See id. at 345. However, the court ruled that, under the Utah 
2
 Appellant's inability to appreciate this distinction is demonstrated by the fact that she 
filed her notice of claim with the Utah State Attorney General, which is required only for 
claims against the State. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993). 
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Municipal Code, "the city recorder has such a significant relationship with the city 
I I 
council that one would be justified in filing notice of claim with the recorder." Id. at 346. 
The court went on to cite a myriad of statutory provisions that inextricably tied the city 
council with the city recorder. See id. (citing statutes). 
In contrast, there is no significant relationship between UTA's claims department 
and its Board of Directors. Unlike city councils and recorders, no statutes or rules 
inextricably link the functions of UTA's claims department and its Board of Directors. 
Thus, the Larsen holding has no application to this case and does not excuse Appellant's 
failure to strictly comply with the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was required to strictly comply with the Act's notice of claim 
requirements. Appellant failed to comply with these requirements and has presented no 
valid reason for excusing this failure. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's ruling that Appellant failed to comply with the Act. 
3
 Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals' holding in Bischel v. Merritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995) has no application to this case. The Bischel case was another case that the 
Court of Appeals later limited to its "unique factual underpinnings." Bellonio v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Specifically, the claimant 
in Bischel received confirmation from the "governing body" itself, in that case the county 
commission, that service of a notice of claim on the county attorney was appropriate. See 
907 P.2d at 278. However, such confirmation is ineffective if it does come from "the 
proper agent to receive the statutorily mandated notice of claim." Bellonio v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 911 P.2d at 1297. In this case, Appellant does not claim to have contacted 
UTA's Board of Trustees regarding service of a notice of claim. Rather, Appellant 
claims to have spoken with an employee of UTA's claims department. Hence, Appellant 
did not receive confirmation from the proper agent to receive the notice of claim, and 
Bischel does not apply to this case. 
10 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of June, 2001. 
Snell & Wilmer 
L. Sullivan^ 
Scott C. Sandberg 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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UTAH CODE 
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(2) The state planning coordinator shall review and forward the comments 
and recommendations of the RDCC to: 
(a) the governor; 
(b) the initiating state agency, in the case of a proposed state action; and 
(c) the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
History: C. 1953, 63-28a-5, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1981, ch. 187, § 1, listing the 
1994, ch. 6, § 3. functions and duties of the RDCC, and enacts 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws the present section, effective May 2, 1994. 
1994, ch. 6, § 3 repeals former § 63-28a-5, as 
63-28a-7. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch. 6, § 4 repeals § 1, providing an effective date for the act, 
§ 63-28a-7,' as enacted by Laws 1981, ch. 187, effective May 2, 1994. 
CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Section Section 
63-30-2. Definitions. 63-30-18. Compromise and settlement ofac-
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury tions. 
caused by negligent act or omis-
sion of employee — Exceptions. 
63-30-1, Short title. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Assault and 
Battery Exception to Waiver of Governmental 
Immunity in Utah, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 400. 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, 
servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, 
members of a board, members of a commission, or members of an 
advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 
67-5b-104, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section 
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services 
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, 
volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contrac-
tor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection 
(2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives 
compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions 
as defined in this chapter. 
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(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opers 
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or nc 
the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is charac 
terized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental functioi 
unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to c 
not essential to a government or governmental function, or could \ 
performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depar 
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss 
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, 
estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or h 
agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than proper 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school distric 
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement 
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporatior 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estat 
or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depai 
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, colle^ 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch. 603" in Subsection (2)(a) and made 
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1; punctuation change. 
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st The 1994 amendment by ch. 260, effect 
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338; 1991, ch. j u i y i, 1994, substituted "Section 62A-4a-5' 
248, § 6; 1994, ch. 192, § 1; 1994, ch. 260, for "Section 62A-4-603" in Subsection (2)(a). 
§ 79. Thj s s e c t ion is set out as reconciled by 1 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
 0 f f i c e o f Legislative Research and Gene 
ment by ch. 192, effective May 2, 1994, substi- Counsel 
tuted "Section 67-5b-104" for "Section 62A-4-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS against the Utah Division of Water Resour 
was error. Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karr 
Governmental function.
 g 0 6 R 2 d 6 ( U t a h a A 1 9 9 4 ) 
Cited. 
~ . . , .. Cited in Wright v. University of Utah, . 
Governmental function.
 d ^ c } d e n i e d 8 g 3 j 
Trial courts retroactive application of the
 1QKQ nUnu I Q Q ^ T n „ w*.v,i«,**An r«,, 
^^ss^^^^i£ jyar^rrCou 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Schools and school districts. of public policy in discharge of emplo 
Because it is undisputed that the county Broadbent v. Board of Educ, 910 P.2d 1 
school district is a governmental entity dis- (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 
charging a governmental function, the district (Utah 1996). 
would be immune from suit for alleged violation 
I 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
TITLE 
State A&eirn 
in General 
'{£3Z?JXi£$S? 
* 3S.^JKS-t-^.v w ^ J V ^ 
ssssrsasnrnrr... 
UTAH 
jj.1 0-
ANNOTATED 
~ ~ V , -St. ~< -y -
z r J 
a 993 
Replacement 
trjr-r^7 
MICdIE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-11 
plicate vehicle title had 
t had improperly issued 
le certificate upon which 
making its loan, was 
cal immunity. The issu-
titles and recordkeeping 
governmental functions 
ider § 63-30-3. Further, 
of immunity for negli-
under Subsection (3) of 
alleged injury arises out 
le certificate. Metropoli-
14 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986). 
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 
docks v. Salt Lake City 
Utah 1987); Loveland v. 
P.2d 763 (Utah 1987); 
County, 771 P.2d 1053 
/. State, 822 P.2d 764 
v. Rasmussen, 792 F. 
992). 
al governmental unit or 
287. 
or sanitarium for negli-
surgeon, 51 A.L.R.4th 
or negligent fire inspec-
iforcement, 69 A.L.R.4th 
dence of polygraph test 
sal to take test, in action 
,ion, 10 A.L.R.5th 663. 
1 and slander exception 
immunity under Federal 
USCS § 2680(h)), 79 
USCS §§ 2680(a) and 
>rt Claims Act liability 
ent informant's conduct, 
private prop-
stitution, immunity 
:overy of compensa-
entity has taken or 
:ompensation. 
ling to the require-
:9, 1991, added "As pro-
ion 22 of the Utah Con-
id "for public uses" in 
Subsection (1) and inserted "Eminent Domain" 
and made a related punctuation change in Sub-
section (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Pro-
cedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166. 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests, 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for recovery 
of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be 
filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2-
404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter tha t is related to a claim for attor-
neys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought contemporaneously with the 
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.6, enac ted by L. 
1991, ch . 259, § 50; 1992, ch . 280, § 56. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the refer-
ence to § 63-2-405 in Subsection (1). 
Effective Dates . — Laws 1992, ch. 280, 
§ 63 makes L. 1991, ch. 259 effective July 1, 
1992. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations tha t would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a wiitten notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
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(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompe-
tent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claim-
ant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of 
claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applica-
ble statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4; 
1991, ch. 76, § 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added the sub-
section designations in Subsection (3)(b) and 
made related changes and deleted "or impris-
oned" after "legal guardian" and made related 
changes in Subsection (4)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Assignment of municipal debt. 
Clear statement of claims required. 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Damages not specified. 
Failure to file claim. 
Notice. 
Sufficiency of notice. 
— Nature of claim asserted. 
Waiver of objections by city. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Functions of the notice of claim requirement 
in giving the affected governmental entity an 
opportunity to promptly investigate and rem-
edy defects immediately, in avoiding unneces-
sary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties 
which might attend changes in administration 
provide sufficient justification for its imposi-
tion as to governmental but not other tort-fea-
sors, and therefore this section does not deny 
equal protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563 
P.2d 192 (Utah 1977). 
Assignment of municipal d e b t 
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes 
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim re-
quired to be submitted to city in accordance 
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former 
law). 
Clear statement of claims required. 
The purpose of notice-of-claim requirement 
is to require every claimant to state clearly all 
of the elements of his claims to the board of 
commissioners or city council for allowance as 
a condition precedent to his right to sue the 
city and recover his damages in an ordinary 
action. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 
134 P. 1167 (1913). 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Statutory right to recover is available only 
upon compliance with the conditions upon 
which right is conferred. One who seeks to en-
force the right must by allegation and proof 
bring himself within the conditions prescribed 
thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 
362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940). 
Damages not specified. 
A claim that stated the time, place and gen-
eral nature of the injury and the sidewalk de-
fect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former 
section even though the amount of damages 
was not stated; since the claim had to be filed 
within thirty days of the injury, the exact 
amount of damages was impossible to ascer-
tain. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 
362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (decided under former 
law). 
Failure to file claim. 
Because no claim was filed as required by 
this section, action to recover moneys expended 
to construct bridge which city had agreed to 
construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Es-
tate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 
405 (1934). 
Exceptional circumstances were not present 
to allow a suit for inj 
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ty, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 
»stances were not present 
to allow a suit for injuries sustained in a plane 
crash, since the fact that the plane crashed 
gave the plaintiff reasonable grounds to ques-
tion whether a city was enforcing its ordinance 
and requiring an airline regulated by the city 
to keep its airplanes in airworthy condition. 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 
(Utah 1992). 
A potential plaintiffs claim that he was pre-
vented from discovering a cause of action for a 
plane crash in which he was injured because 
the city did not return his phone calls was in-
sufficient; and while a party may be excused 
for failing to pursue a claim if the party acted 
in reasonable reliance on a defendant's repre-
sentations, absent any representations or con-
cealment by the defendant, a plaintiff must 
take reasonable steps to prosecute the claim. 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 
(Utah 1992). 
Notice. 
The supervision of disbursement of escrowed 
funds is not of such a unique nature that it 
could only be performed by a governmental en-
tity and is not essential to the core of govern-
mental activity; therefore, disbursement of es-
crowed funds does not constitute a governmen-
tal function for purposes of § 63-30-3 and is not 
subject to the notice requirement of this sec-
tion. Cox v. Utah Mtg. & Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 
783 (Utah 1986). 
Service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
The notice of claim provision would probably 
be interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court as 
applicable to all claims against state em-
ployees, whether or not any judgment might 
ultimately be payable by the state, as long as 
the employees' alleged acts were in the course 
of their employment. Kabwasa v. University of 
Utah, 785 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Utah 1990). 
The plain meaning of § 63-30-12 requires 
that two notices of claim should have been filed 
by plaintiff: one to the attorney general and 
one to the agency concerned. Although this 
statutory requiiement may result in redun-
dant notice, the redundancy apparently is 
mandated by the statute as the Utah attorney 
general is the agent and legal counsel for all 
state agencies, including the University of 
Utah. Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F., 
Supp. 1445 (D. Utah 1990). 
Sufficiency of notice. 
Under this section, a notice in which dam-
ages were specified as "for general impair-
ment" of an automobile was an insufficient de-
scription of the damages and one which could 
not be cured by amendment. Sweet v. Salt 
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913) 
(decided under former law). 
—Nature of claim asserted. 
A notice of claim for physical and emotional 
distress resulting from an alleged assault and 
battery at the hands of police officers was an 
insufficient description of the "nature of the 
claim asserted" to permit plaintiff to amend 
her complaint, after the time had run for filing 
notice, to allege malicious prosecution and 
false arrest. Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 
(Utah 1990). 
Waiver of objections by city. 
In action against city for injuries sustained 
as result of defective sidewalk, objection that 
plaintiff's claim was not verified and did not 
sufficiently describe extent of injury was 
waived by city, where it did not decline to con-
sider claim, but acted upon it. Bowman v. 
Ogden City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P. 561 (1908) (de-
cided under former law). 
Failure to file claim barred action against 
town; consideration of claim by town did not 
waive the filing requirement. Hurley v. Town 
of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924). 
City council had no discretion to waive veri-
fication of notice of street or sidewalk injury 
claims; evidence of waiver or estoppel by city 
employees respecting filing of notice was inad-
missible where not alleged. Hamilton v. Salt 
Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940) 
(decided under former law). 
Cited in Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1988); Jepson v. State, 846 P.2d 485 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Amount of damages stated in no-
tice of claim against municipality or county as 
limiting amount of recovery, 24 A.L.R.3d 965. 
Incapacity caused by accident in suit as af-
fecting notice of claim required as condition of 
holding state and local governmental unit lia-
ble for personal injury, 44 A.L.R.3d 1108. 
Attorney's mistake or neglect as excuse for 
failing to file timely notice of tort claim 
against state or local governmental unit, 55 
A.L.R.3d 930. 
Plaintiffs right to bring tort action against 
municipality prior to expiration of statutory 
waiting period, 73 A.L.R.3d 1019. 
Maintenance of class action against govern-
mental entity as affected by requirement of no-
tice of claim, 76 A.L.R.3d 1244. | 
Local government tort liability: minority as 
affecting notice of claim requirement, 58 
A.L.R.4th 402. 
Insufficiency of notice of claim against mu-
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nicipality as regards statement of place where 
accident occurred, 69 A.L.R.4th 484. 
63-30-12, Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch. 
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 5. 
Cross-References . — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section, § 63-30-5. 
Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et 
seq. 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions, § €3-37-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Cause of action. 
Claims for death. 
Compliance with section. 
Federal claim. 
Notice. 
Quiet title actions. 
Remedy for wrongful act. 
Cited. 
C a u s e of ac t ion. 
A cause of action against the state accrues at 
the time of the subject accident rather than 
when a plaintiff satisfies the threshold require-
ments under § 31A-22-309. Jepson v. State, 
846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Claims for death. 
In cases involving claims for death, the stat-
utory period would begin to run on the date of 
death of the person injured, inasmuch as that 
is the date upon which the damage accrues to 
the personal representative or third party enti-
tled to recover for the wrongful death. Nelson 
v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356, 135 P.2d 259 
(1943) (decided under former law). 
Compliance with section. 
Complaint alleging that tax commission and 
its agent acted maliciously and arbitrarily in 
at tempting to enforce payment of excise taxes 
and in compelling plaintiff to supply a surety 
in greater amount than was reasonable to en-
sure payment of the tax, requesting damages 
both compensatory and punitive, was fatally 
defective in that it did not allege compliance 
with this section; tax commission and its agent 
were immune from suit for damages where the 
acts complained of were performed in good 
faith and within the statutory authority 
granted to them. Roosendaal Constr. & Mining 
Corp. v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 
(1972). 
Plaintiffs complied with this section by fil-
ing, within a year after the cause of action 
arose, a notice of claim with the attorney gen-
eral and the agency concerned on the same day 
they filed the original complaint with the 
court, and amended complaint alleging compli-
ance with the Governmental Immunity Act 
was filed, as a matter of right, within one year 
after denial of the claim or after the end of the 
90-day period in which the claim is deemed to 
have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State Re-
tirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
Action against state predicated on govern-
mental supervision of financial institutions in-
volved the exercise of a governmental function 
and was barred where there was no compliance 
with the notice of claim provisions of 
§§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-12. Madsen v. Borthick, 
658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
In an action against the Utah State Depart-
ment of Transportation, this section, requiring 
notice both to the attorney general and the de-
partment, is applicable, not Rule 4(e)(ll) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; an action 
against the state is barred if the notice re-
quired by this section is not filed. Lamarr v. 
State DOT, 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Federal claim. 
A federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may 
not be barred by failure to meet state statutory 
requirements, such as the "notice of claim'* re-
quirement in this sect' 
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quirement in this section. Edwards v. Hare, 
682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
Notice. 
Service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
(But see note under catchline "Federal claim" 
above.) 
This section requires that two notices of 
claim should have been filed by plaintiff: one to 
the attorney general and one to the agency 
concerned. Although this statutory require-
ment may result in redundant notice, the re-
dundancy apparently is mandated by the stat-
ute inasmuch as the Utah attorney general is 
the agent and legal counsel for all state agen-
cies, including the University of Utah. 
Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F. Supp. 
1445 (D. Utah 1990). 
The notice of claim provision would probably 
be interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court as 
applicable to all claims against state em-
ployees, whether or not any judgment might 
ultimately be payable by the state, as long as 
the employees' alleged acts were taken in the 
course of their employment. Kabwasa v. Uni-
versity of Utah, 785 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Utah 
1990). 
Quiet title actions. 
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies with 
this section if it is given not more than one 
year after plaintiffs right to possession has 
been disturbed or encroached upon by the 
state. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977). 
R e m e d y for wrongfu l ac t . 
The 1978 amendment to § 63-30-4 did not 
leave the parents without a remedy for their 
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity 
for simple negligence to doctors employed by 
the state, since parents had a remedy against 
the state for injuries arising out of the negli-
gent acts of state employees, but the parents 
failed to give notice of their claim to the state 
within one year as required by this section. 
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 
(Utah 1987). 
Cited in Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218 
(Utah 1989); O'Neal v. Division of Family 
Servs., 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah L a w Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts, 
1989 Utah L. Rev. 334. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur . 2d States, Ter-
ritories, and Dependencies §§ 124, 126. 
C.J .S . — 81A C.J.S. States §§ 269, 271, 272, 
310. 
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations listed un-
der § 63-30-11. 
Key N u m b e r s . — States <s= 174, 177, 197. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice, 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted 
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch. 
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6. 
Cross-References . — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section, § 63-30-5. 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions, § 63-37-1 et seq. 
S.C. § 1983 may 
et state statutory 
tice of claim" re-
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative proceedings. 
Claims barred. 
Claims by minors. 
Claims for death. 
Contract action. 
Effect of 1987 amendment. 
Estoppel. 
Exemptions. 
—Equitable claims. 
Full compliance required. 
Necessity for presentation of claim. 
Notice. 
Cited. 
Admin i s t r a t i ve p roceed ings . 
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement fol-
lowing decision to terminate his services had 
no claim for breach of contract until after ad-
verse result a t administrative hearing pro-
vided for by the school termination provisions 
(now § 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he 
filed his notice of claim within the statutory 
period after termination of the hearing, he 
complied with the requirements of this section. 
Pra t t v. Board of Educ , 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 
1977) (decided under former law). 
Claims barred. 
Neither actual knowledge by county officials 
of circumstances which resulted in death of 
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile 
accident nor minority of the child dispensed 
with necessity of filing timely claim in action 
against county in which it was alleged that 
death was due to inadequate warning signs 
and an improperly constructed guardrail; 
timely claim against county was necessary 
even though county highway department em-
ployee allegedly advised child's attorney, incor-
rectly, that highway in question was main-
tained by state, resulting in initial filing of 
claim against state. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973). 
Trial court properly dismissed complaint 
against county where notice of the claim was 
not filed with the county commission during 
the year following plaintiffs discovery of her 
injuries. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Cen-
ter, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); Yearsley v. 
Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). 
Cla ims by mino r s . 
Failure of a minor to give notice within the 
time provided in this section does not bar the 
minor's claim as the time for notice is tolled 
during minority by § 78-12-36. Scott v. School 
Bd., 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977). 
Claims for death. 
In cases involving claims for death, the stat-
utory period would commence to run on the 
date of death of the person injured, inasmuch 
as that is the date upon which the damage ac-
crues to the personal representative or third 
party entitled to recover for such wrongful 
death. Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356, 
135 P.2d 259 (1943) (decided under former 
law). 
Contract action. 
An action on a contractual obligation is a 
claim permitted under this chapter, and notice 
of such claim must be filed in accordance with 
this section. Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 
291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972). 
Effect of 1987 amendment. 
In 1987, the legislature amended this section 
to require the timely filing of a notice of claim 
irrespective of whether the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
The amendment does not apply retroactively. 
White Pine Ranches v. Snyderville Basin 
Sewer Improvement Dist., 819 P.2d 801 (Utah 
1991). 
Estoppel. 
County was not estopped from pleading the 
filing deadline of the statutory period as a bar 
to the claim of a boy who had been injured at 
school while playing with dangling wires, even 
though the principal of the school erroneously 
informed the mother that public service com-
pany was responsible for the wires, and she did 
not discover until after the filing deadline that 
the county tree-trimming employees were in 
fact responsible. Scarborough v. Granite School 
Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) (decided under 
former law). 
Exemptions. 
—Equitable claims. 
A subdivider's claims for fees paid under a 
municipal ordinance were equitable and there-
fore exempt from the filing requirements and 
time limits imposed by this chapter. American 
Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 
757 (Utah 1992). 
Full compliance required. 
Before suit against a political subdivision 
can be allowed, plaintiff must have fully com-
plied with the statutory requirements; and 
thus, prior to filing suit, a claim must be filed 
which (1) is in writing, (2) states the facts and 
the nature of the claim, (3) is signed by the 
claimant, (4) is directed and delivered to some-
one authorized to receive it, and (5) has been 
filed within the prescribed time. Scarborough 
v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1975). 
Necessi ty for presentation of claim. 
Plaintiff had no cause of action for damages 
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scribed time. Scarborough 
Dist, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 
to his crops caused by seepage of water from 
defendant city's canal where no claim was pre-
sented therefor to city within a year. Dahl v. 
Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 (1915) 
(decided under former law). 
Presentation of claim within time fixed by 
law is a condition precedent to bringing action 
against municipality. Brown v. Salt Lake City, 
33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619, 
126 Am. St. R. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (1908); 
Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 
P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law). 
Notice. 
The fact that employees of the county in fact 
knew of the plaintiffs injuries at the time they 
occurred does not dispense with the necessity 
of filing a timely claim. Edwards v. Iron 
County ex rel. Valley View Medical Center, 
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975). 
Notice requirement is applicable to 
§ 63-30-9. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former 
law). 
Notice-of-claim provisions applied to former 
county employee's sex discrimination claims 
arising from acts occurring after the effective 
date of the 1987 amendment, notwithstanding 
her contention that the conduct complained of 
was continuous in nature, stemming from ear-
lier sexual harassment occurring before the ef-
fective date of the amendment. Sauers v. Salt 
Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990). 
Cited in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 
(Utah 1985); Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations listed un-
der § 63-30-11. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Counties «= 200, 203, 213; 
Municipal Corporations «- 1001, 1005, 1008, 
1021; Schools <s=> 112. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur . 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political 
Subdivisions § 680 et seq. 
C.J .S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 239, 240; 64 
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2173, 2174, 
2199; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts 
§§ 423, 433. 
63-30-14, Claim for injury — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its 
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end 
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14. 
63-30-15, Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity, 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1983, ch. 
129, § 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7. 
sen ta t ion of claim. 
ause of action for damages 
205 
1 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed 
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon 
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified 
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 
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that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
History: Amended effective November 1,1997. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, in Subdivision (c), substituted the first sentence for the 
former first sentence which read "The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing"; deleted the former second sentence which read "The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits"; and deleted "forthwith" following "rendered" in the present second 
sentence. 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
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